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"Advancing Artificial Intelligence with Kant"

"To know anything in space (for instance, a line) I must draw it"  Kant, I. , Critique of Pure Reason, B 137/138

Listen on Academia.edu to an AI generated podcast in English of my German paper of 1991

MIT KANT FORTSCHREITEN IN DER KÜNSTLICHEN INTELLIGENZ

[paper published in KANT YEARBOOK (Kantovski sbornik), 16, 75-84 (1991)]

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ABSTRACT

Through "knowledge processing," AI (artificial intelligence) intends to realize the functions of human thought (and not just its results) in computers. "Knowledge representation" is the main problem today, for which many individual detailed solutions have been found in practice, but the fundamental questions remain unanswered.
With the help of Kant's analysis of the conceptual faculty in the "Critique of Pure Reason," a new methodology—called "critical methodology"—can be developed for basic research in this field.
Previous AI models neglect the conceptual faculty, limit themselves to the concepts themselves (symbolic dimension, formal logic), and one-sidedly favor an analytical (passive) object reference (AI dogmatism).
Critical methodology emphasizes the importance—for knowledge processing—of the functions from which concepts arise, introduces the additional object dimension (two-dimensional, transcendental logic), and adds a synthetic (productive) object reference.

The goal is both an "operational knowledge representation" in which knowledge of every kind is represented as a structure of synthetic operations, and an integrated model of knowledge (symbol+object, synthetic+analytic). 

 

How Objects Conform to Knowing

 A short paper to commemorate Kant’s 300th birthday

 "How Objects Conform to Knowing: Kant’s Example of a Line"

Marco Bettoni

1. Introduction

How do we know something in space, for instance a line? In 1787, at the core of his theory of knowledge, Kant mentions an example which answers this question in the following way (B 138) [1]:

“To know anything in space, for instance, a line, I must draw it”
(original: «Um aber irgend etwas im Raume zu erkennen, z.B. eine Linie, muss ich sie ziehen“).

In other words, in order to know (see, feel) a line in space I must do something (for example look in a certain way) or, more precisely, I must perform certain mental operations, call them “line operations”. We will see later that by "I must draw it" Kant does not refer to a physical line in space affecting our sense organs but only to a mental act.This means that even if there is no physical line involved, whenever I perform those line operations, then as a result, I will know a line. By performing “line operations” in space we obtain as a result lines, we know lines. This means that the relation between objects and knowing is of the kind result-to-operation (Fig. 1).  

Fig. 1 The relationship between objects and knowing

Look now at Figure 2: the white circles on a black background represent schematically stars in the night sky. There are no drawn (physical) lines, but according to Kant’s example, you could nonetheless be able to know (see) some line: how?

 

 

Fig. 2 The night sky (Ceccato 1980; Parini 1996)

If what we know in space depends on what we do, on the mental operations we perform, then, in the case of vision, what happens is that what we see depends on how we look. We can of course see Figure 2 as “chaos” but also see in it an ordered set of straight (Figure 3) or circular lines (Figure 4). And many other different ordered ways of looking at Figure 2 are possible (spiral lines, combined spiral and linear lines, etc.).

                      

Fig. 3 Straight lines that                                             Fig. 4 Circular lines that
can be seen in Fig. 2                                                  can be seen in Fig. 2

2. Fundamental question and answer

    In a famous letter to his friend Markus Herz (21.2.1772) Kant wrote that he was planning to publish a work in which he wanted to answer the question:

«on which ground is founded the relation between what we call 'Vorstellung' [knowledge unit, knowing] in us and the object» («auf welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung desjenigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand»).

Fifteen years later, in the second edition of his main work, the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the answer to that question as the central hypothesis of his theory by saying that objects must conform to our knowing [2]. He also emphasizes that this "revolution" (so-called Copernican Revoltuion) constitutes the main purpose of the Critique (BXXII).

Fig. 5 Kant’s Copernican Revolution

In order to understand Kant's "Copernican Revolution" (objects must conform to our knowing) and its consequences for epistemology in 2024, the real challenge lies in a critical reflection upon the specific components of Kant's hypothesis, which amounts at asking 3 crucial questions:

1. What is Kant's conception of "object"?
2.  What is Kant's conception of "must conform to"?
3.  What is Kant's conception of "(faculty of) knowing"?

3. How a line conforms to our knowing

The basis for answering these 3 questions can be found in the Analytic of Concepts (Kant, B90 to B 169). As an example, consider, in the Deduction, Kant's summarized explanation of his hypothesis in the crucial § 17 in the B edition of the Critique [3] (B137, my translation based on Kemp-Smith):

“Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge.  This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given knowledge units to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of knowledge units demands in fact unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them.”

The mechanism described in this passage is that of "Vereinigung" (unification) of what we call "Vorstellungen" (knowledge units). Kant specifies further that this unification mechanism should act when "Vorstellungen" are synthesized ("in der Synthesis") and that the result of its operation is an (experiential) object. From this I conclude that this description could be clearly interpreted as an operational explanation (a proposition of a generative mechanism, Maturana 1988) of the totally new conception of "object" that Kant needs in order to articulate his Copernican Revolution.

Tightly related to that explanation, a few lines further Kant gives the previously mentioned example of a line, one of his most famous (and rare) examples [4] (B138, translation Kemp Smith):

„To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. “

Here Kant wants to explain how we know a "line" and if we look at the functional side of what he writes we see that he presents an operational explanation. In fact, Kant describes here a "line mechanism" that, if you let it operate in your mind, gives you as result of your mental operations that "line" that he wants to explain.

What is exemplified here for the case of a line is also paradigmatically valid for any acquired experience-independent knowledge unit (a priori concepts like begin, end, singular, plural, unit, element, part, whole, space, time, number, here, there, now, etc.): we should try to develop also for them generative mechanisms which, if we let them operate in our mind, would deliver the acquired a priori concept that we want to explain.

4 Kant’s A Priori is not innate

Finally, I would like to conclude this short paper to commemorate Kant’s 300th birthday with a remark on Kant’s conception of the apriori.

As Michael Oberhausen (1997) remarks: "To simply consider Kant's apriori as innate still is a widespread cliché". This cliché is being disseminated not only by contemporary philosophers - with whom Kant is known to be in contradiction - but also by scientists when they approach Kant's work.

Indeed, this is not astonishing if we consider that Kant's doctrine of the acquisition of experience-independent elements 'up to now has been quite ignored by research' (Oberhausen 1997, p. 6).

Fortunately, we have now Oberhausen's comprehensive study which supplies the proof that Kant's doctrine of the acquisition of a priori constructs ('Vorstellungen') is not of no or only of secondary relevance but "lies at the center of critical philosophy". In his summary Oberhausen emphasises that Kant "in many different places of his work again and again explicitly explained that both space and time as well as pure concepts are acquired ..." (Oberhausen 1997, p.6).

5 Conclusion

What are now the implications of such considerations for us in 2024?  I think that they can help to answer the crucial question of experience (learning): What do we contribute of our own to our knowledge?

In the light of Kant's explanations, the answer is that what we contribute of our own are the mechanisms and operations of acquisition, generalisation and application of acquired experience-independent elements ('reine Verstandesbegriffe a priori') that implement the unity of experience (categories) and are the conditions of possibility of experience.

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Kant for his life and for his work! His life is an example to me and his work gives me hope. Hope that we can find support in mastering the difficult task of making human beings out of ourselves, i.e. coming closer to the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity than has been the case up to now.

That's why I'm so very grateful to Kant and why it has been my pleasure and duty to remind ourselves with a short text that we still urgently need Kant's philosophy in 2024.

Notes

Aristotle, Kant and the two worlds

FROM ARISTOTLE (350 BCE)
TO KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1787)
AND ITS 2 WORLDS (2022)

 

We have seen in a previous blog post that according to Aristotle:

• the essence of a definite thing is its form, which is that cause by reason of which the matter is that definite thing (1).

As a cosequence, according to Aristotle's view: GIVEN a definite thing, we can obtain its essence by SEPARATING its form from its matter.

In that post I claimed that Aristotle made a small error and proposed how to correct it. In the previous sentence, the error can be corrected by simply substituting the third "is" with "becomes". Then we obtain:

• the essence of a definite thing is its form, which is that cause by reason of which the matter BECOMES that definite thing.

The correction is small but the consequences are huge: the definite thing is no longer GIVEN. It is a product that results from ADDING form to matter.

Thus, this simple substitution leads to a REVOLUTION: it turns the whole situation upside down, like in Kant's Copernican Revolution.

But there is a second main consequence, that Kant forgot to mention: that with this substitution, instead of living in one single World (a universe of definite things), we now now live in TWO WORLDS:

1. the world of GIVEN indefinite matter = one physical world, equal for all
2. the world of PRODUCED definite things = many experiential worlds, one for each individual human being.
   

To be human is to keep these two worlds in a homeostatic balance.

The Operational Constructivism Manifesto 2018

1.   OWN WORLD. Although we share the same environment, each of us lives in his own world (thank you A. Schopenhauer).

2.   COPERNICAN REVOLUTION. In this own world, that every human being constructs for her/himself, the objects conform to her/his knowing (thank you I. Kant).

3.   OPERATIONS. For constructing you need operands, operations and schemata (thank you S. Ceccato): together they form a faculty of mental constructs, not a faculty of representations.

4.   AUTOPOIESIS. This faculty of mental constructs works in an autopoietic way (thank you H. Maturana): the outcomes of constructing extend that same faculty, which constructed them (outcome-function dualism).

5.   SELF-ORGANIZATION. In this way, in the course of doing, a self-organizing, intelligent system comes into being (thank you J. Piaget), a whole of compared and connected mental constructs (thank you I. Kant).

6.   VIABILITY. In this system priority belongs to viable mental constructs, i.e. those which stand the test of doing (thank you E. von Glasersfeld).

7.   INNER WORLD. Hence, this own world, is an inner world, made of mentally constructed objects, events, human beings, relationships, social interactions, etc.: all things that each of us constructs by her/himself.

8.   OUTER WORLD. The outer world (physical world) provides material for the construction of mental constructs and is used as environment for testing their viability.

9.   EXPERIENCE. From the coupled control of the outer and inner world (controlled processes) by means of thinking (control unit) arises experience.

10.    KNOWLEDGE. The own world in which each of us lives, is hence primarily an experiential world (thank you E. von Glasersfeld) and knowledge is the logic of this experience.

11.    RESPONSIBILITY. Consequently, the responsibility for knowledge, belongs to the bearer of experience (thank you H. von Förster).

Marco Bettoni

Basel, 26. Oktober 2018

Operationaler Konstruktivismus: Manifest 2018

1. Bei gleicher Umgebung lebt doch jede/r in der eigenen Welt (danke A. Schopenhauer). 
2. In dieser eigenen Welt, die jeder Mensch für sich konstruiert, richten sich die Gegenstände nach seinem Denken («kopernikanische Wende», danke I. Kant). 
3. Zum Konstruieren braucht es Operanden, Operationen und Schemata (danke S. Ceccato): zusammen bilden sie ein Vermögen der Vorstellungen (mentale Konstrukte), nicht der Darstellungen (Repräsentationen). 
4. Dieses Vermögen der Konstruktion von Vorstellungen funktioniert autopoietisch (danke H. Maturana): die Ergebnisse des Konstruierens erweitern jenes Vermögen, das sie konstruiert hat (Ergebnis-Funktion Dualismus)
5. So entsteht im Laufe des Tuns ein selbstorganisierendes, intelligentes System (danke J. Piaget), ein Ganzes verglichener und verknüpfter Vorstellungen (danke I. Kant).
6. In diesem System haben viable Vorstellungen Priorität, d.h. jene, die sich im Tun bewähren (danke E. von Glasersfeld). 
7. Diese eigene Welt ist somit eine innere Welt bestehend aus vorgestellten Gegenständen, Ereignissen, Mitmenschen, Relationen, sozialen Interaktionen, usw.: alles Dinge, die jede/r für sich konstruiert. 
8. Die äussere Welt (physische Welt) stellt Material für die Konstruktion der Vorstellungen zur Verfügung und wird als Umgebung für ihre Bewährung benutzt. 
9. Aus der gekoppelten Regelung der äusseren und inneren Welt (Regelstrecken) durch das Denken (Regler) entsteht Erfahrung. 
10. Die eigene Welt, in der jeder von uns lebt, ist somit primär eine Erfahrungswelt (danke E. von Glasersfeld) und Wissen ist die Logik dieser Erfahrung. 
11. Demzufolge liegt die Verantwortung für das Wissen beim Erfahrungsträger (danke H. von Förster).
    

Marco Bettoni
Basel, 26. Oktober 2018

Mit Aristoteles an den Grenzen des Wissens stossen ... mit Kant darüber hinaus?

Aristoteles philosophische Schriften zu lesen heisst, an den Grenzen unseres Wissens vorzustossen – denn auch heute noch, 2‘338 Jahre nach seinem Tod, stehen wir an derselben Grenze, an die er uns geführt hat, z.B. in Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie.

Wir denken zwar, wir hätten jene Grenze überschritten und unser Wissen erweitert: aber das ist nur Wunschdenken und Illusion. Wir stehen noch auf dieser Seite der Grenze, dort wo Aristoteles schon gestanden ist und werden sie nur überschreiten, wenn wir sein Werk weniger als Antwort auf Fragen sondern vielmehr als Anregung zum Nachdenken begreifen werden.

Immanuel Kant hat uns in seiner "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" den Weg dieser Grenzüberschreitung gewiesen, aber wer versteht schon seine Kernbotschaft?

Beispiel 

Aus "Über die Seele" (De Anima, Περί ψυχής), ein Werk in dem Aristoteles "unter anderem Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie, der Philosophie des Geistes, der philosophischen Psychologie und der Handlungstheorie" (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_anima) anspricht:

• ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται· (Περί ψυχής, Buch A, 403b)
• Übersetzung (eigene): Denn während der Begriff dies ist für den Gegenstand, muss er in jener Materie sein, um zu sein.
• Übersetzung mit Erläuterungen: Denn während der Begriff (λόγος) dies (ὅδε, bezogen auf εἶδος = „Form“ im vorangehenden Satz) ist für den Gegenstand (τοῦ πράγματος), muss er in jener (bezogen auf „Materie“ im vorangehenden Satz) Materie (ὕλῃ) sein, um zu sein (εἰ ἔσται – um zu existieren).

Hier geht es um die Beziehung zwischen Begriff (λόγος) und Gegenstand (πράγμα). Aristoteles verwendet dafür die Relation Form zu Materie und ein nicht näher beschriebener, stillschweigend angenommener Mechanismus, wodurch der Begriff sich in der Materie verwirklicht (Vergegenständlichung). Nun ist genau dieser Mechanismus der entscheidende Punkt, um die Grenze des Wissens in dieser grundlegenden Thematik zu überschreiten! Aristoteles kümmert sich nicht darum: aber er führt uns zu diesem Punkt der Grenze unseres Wissens und es liegt nun an uns:

1. dies zu merken
2. Wege zu finden um die Grenze zu überschreiten

Kant hat das 2‘100 Jahre nach Aristoteles zwar schon getan (siehe seine Analytik der Begriffe), nur wurde sein Beitrag dazu bisher noch nicht in der von ihm gewiesenen Richtung weiterentwickelt (sondern in vielen anderen Richtungen ...), leider.

What Marcuse missed in Bridgman

 Marcuse saw in Bridgman's Operationalism a "total empiricism in the treatment of concepts" because it required an "adequate account of them in terms of operations"; he estimated that this approach was predominant "in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and other fields" and lamented that as a consequence "Many of the most seriously troublesome concepts are being "eliminated”." (Marcuse, 1964 "The One-Dimensional Man", ch. 1, pp. 14-16, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/marcuse/works/one-dimensional-man/ch01.htm)

What a pity, that Marcuse limited his assessment of Bridgman's approach to the weaknesses and missed the opportunity to build on its strenghts!

He could have connected Bridgman's operational view of concepts  with Kant's treatment of concepts in his Critique of Pure Reason; in that same period Ceccato, who did such a connection, was able to do pioneering work in developing a completely new approach to language: Operational Linguistics (http://www.vonglasersfeld.com/242)

The sleep of dogmatism and its function

We sleep an intellectual sleep; it is the sleep of dogmatism - or “slumber” as Kant called it (1783). Why this dogmatic sleep?

Because this sleep helps us. How? Its function is to protect us against the troublesome affordances and the boulversing power of a question:

• how could the reality we refer to be constituted also by profound inner patterns and images made by ourselves?

To ask this question requires to be ready to accept an answer that explains the "how" asked for in the question. It means that we could have to accept an answer which shows, that the reality we claim to be independent from us and valid for all (and "social") is merely our own individual reality, valid for one single person.

As a consequence the dogmatic sleep protects us also against the potentially threatening insight that the reality we refer to (RWRT), although experienced as independent from us/me, is always merely our/my individual reality.

Kant 1783 - Dogmatic slumber

• "I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics  (1783) full text on wikisource.org
• "J’avoue de grand cœur que c’est à l’avertissement donné par David Hume que je dois d’être sorti de­puis bien des années déjà du sommeil dogmatique, et d’avoir donné à mes recherches philosophiques dans le champ de la spéculation, une direction toute nou­velle." Emmanuel Kant (1783), Prolégomènes à toute métaphysique future qui aura le droit de se présenter comme science, Préface. texte complete sur fr.wikisource.org
• "Ich gestehe frei: die Erinnerung des David Hume war eben dasjenige, was mir vor vielen Jahren zuerst den dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach, und meinen Untersuchungen im Felde der spekulativen Philosophie eine ganz andere Richtung gab.", Immanuel Kant (1783), Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, A13. Artikel auf Wikipedia.de

How do we know? EvG 1996

In 1996 Ernst von Glasersfeld wrote:

• The concept of knowledge is thus actually changing. Traditional philosophy was forever searching for timeless truths that would be independent of the thinking subject. With the spreading of the Kantian insight that what we rationally grasp is always what human reason builds up according to its own rules, interest has been growing in how this building-up proceeds. And this is the area in which we celebrate Heinz von Foerster as a pioneer. 
• There can be no final answers in this area but only models that, for the time being, satisfy our demands. Hence he reminds us that the responsibility for the world we conceptually construct and enact rests with us.
• Farewell to objectivity (Revised and expanded English version of 136) . Systems Research 13(3): 279–286.

The All-in-one Puppeteer - A Constructivist Allegory