How Objects Conform to Knowing

 A short paper to commemorate Kant’s 300th birthday

 "How Objects Conform to Knowing: Kant’s Example of a Line"

Marco Bettoni

1. Introduction

How do we know something in space, for instance a line? In 1787, at the core of his theory of knowledge, Kant mentions an example which answers this question in the following way (B 138) [1]:

“To know anything in space, for instance, a line, I must draw it”
(original: «Um aber irgend etwas im Raume zu erkennen, z.B. eine Linie, muss ich sie ziehen“).

In other words, in order to know (see, feel) a line in space I must do something (for example look in a certain way) or, more precisely, I must perform certain mental operations, call them “line operations”. We will see later that by "I must draw it" Kant does not refer to a physical line in space affecting our sense organs but only to a mental act.This means that even if there is no physical line involved, whenever I perform those line operations, then as a result, I will know a line. By performing “line operations” in space we obtain as a result lines, we know lines. This means that the relation between objects and knowing is of the kind result-to-operation (Fig. 1).  

Fig. 1 The relationship between objects and knowing

Look now at Figure 2: the white circles on a black background represent schematically stars in the night sky. There are no drawn (physical) lines, but according to Kant’s example, you could nonetheless be able to know (see) some line: how?

 

 

Fig. 2 The night sky (Ceccato 1980; Parini 1996)

If what we know in space depends on what we do, on the mental operations we perform, then, in the case of vision, what happens is that what we see depends on how we look. We can of course see Figure 2 as “chaos” but also see in it an ordered set of straight (Figure 3) or circular lines (Figure 4). And many other different ordered ways of looking at Figure 2 are possible (spiral lines, combined spiral and linear lines, etc.).

                      

Fig. 3 Straight lines that                                             Fig. 4 Circular lines that
can be seen in Fig. 2                                                  can be seen in Fig. 2

2. Fundamental question and answer

    In a famous letter to his friend Markus Herz (21.2.1772) Kant wrote that he was planning to publish a work in which he wanted to answer the question:

«on which ground is founded the relation between what we call 'Vorstellung' [knowledge unit, knowing] in us and the object» («auf welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung desjenigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand»).

Fifteen years later, in the second edition of his main work, the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the answer to that question as the central hypothesis of his theory by saying that objects must conform to our knowing [2]. He also emphasizes that this "revolution" (so-called Copernican Revoltuion) constitutes the main purpose of the Critique (BXXII).

Fig. 5 Kant’s Copernican Revolution

In order to understand Kant's "Copernican Revolution" (objects must conform to our knowing) and its consequences for epistemology in 2024, the real challenge lies in a critical reflection upon the specific components of Kant's hypothesis, which amounts at asking 3 crucial questions:

1. What is Kant's conception of "object"?
2.  What is Kant's conception of "must conform to"?
3.  What is Kant's conception of "(faculty of) knowing"?

3. How a line conforms to our knowing

The basis for answering these 3 questions can be found in the Analytic of Concepts (Kant, B90 to B 169). As an example, consider, in the Deduction, Kant's summarized explanation of his hypothesis in the crucial § 17 in the B edition of the Critique [3] (B137, my translation based on Kemp-Smith):

“Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge.  This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given knowledge units to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of knowledge units demands in fact unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them.”

The mechanism described in this passage is that of "Vereinigung" (unification) of what we call "Vorstellungen" (knowledge units). Kant specifies further that this unification mechanism should act when "Vorstellungen" are synthesized ("in der Synthesis") and that the result of its operation is an (experiential) object. From this I conclude that this description could be clearly interpreted as an operational explanation (a proposition of a generative mechanism, Maturana 1988) of the totally new conception of "object" that Kant needs in order to articulate his Copernican Revolution.

Tightly related to that explanation, a few lines further Kant gives the previously mentioned example of a line, one of his most famous (and rare) examples [4] (B138, translation Kemp Smith):

„To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. “

Here Kant wants to explain how we know a "line" and if we look at the functional side of what he writes we see that he presents an operational explanation. In fact, Kant describes here a "line mechanism" that, if you let it operate in your mind, gives you as result of your mental operations that "line" that he wants to explain.

What is exemplified here for the case of a line is also paradigmatically valid for any acquired experience-independent knowledge unit (a priori concepts like begin, end, singular, plural, unit, element, part, whole, space, time, number, here, there, now, etc.): we should try to develop also for them generative mechanisms which, if we let them operate in our mind, would deliver the acquired a priori concept that we want to explain.

4 Kant’s A Priori is not innate

Finally, I would like to conclude this short paper to commemorate Kant’s 300th birthday with a remark on Kant’s conception of the apriori.

As Michael Oberhausen (1997) remarks: "To simply consider Kant's apriori as innate still is a widespread cliché". This cliché is being disseminated not only by contemporary philosophers - with whom Kant is known to be in contradiction - but also by scientists when they approach Kant's work.

Indeed, this is not astonishing if we consider that Kant's doctrine of the acquisition of experience-independent elements 'up to now has been quite ignored by research' (Oberhausen 1997, p. 6).

Fortunately, we have now Oberhausen's comprehensive study which supplies the proof that Kant's doctrine of the acquisition of a priori constructs ('Vorstellungen') is not of no or only of secondary relevance but "lies at the center of critical philosophy". In his summary Oberhausen emphasises that Kant "in many different places of his work again and again explicitly explained that both space and time as well as pure concepts are acquired ..." (Oberhausen 1997, p.6).

5 Conclusion

What are now the implications of such considerations for us in 2024?  I think that they can help to answer the crucial question of experience (learning): What do we contribute of our own to our knowledge?

In the light of Kant's explanations, the answer is that what we contribute of our own are the mechanisms and operations of acquisition, generalisation and application of acquired experience-independent elements ('reine Verstandesbegriffe a priori') that implement the unity of experience (categories) and are the conditions of possibility of experience.

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Kant for his life and for his work! His life is an example to me and his work gives me hope. Hope that we can find support in mastering the difficult task of making human beings out of ourselves, i.e. coming closer to the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity than has been the case up to now.

That's why I'm so very grateful to Kant and why it has been my pleasure and duty to remind ourselves with a short text that we still urgently need Kant's philosophy in 2024.

Notes

The essence of the essence of constructivism

In one famous article dating from 1988 (German edition 1998), Maturana states that the problem of reality is “the most important problem of our time”. I fully agree with him and I think that realism needs to be expressively refuted and the choice between realism and constructivism cannot be considered “a matter of taste”, an attitude which in my view prevents to make progress in solving the problem of reality in a more viable way. 

In the constructivist thesis that “reality is the construction of an observer” and in the realist thesis that “reality exists independently”, the term reality is merely a homonym, means two different things! Hence the common attitude to mention them, as if they would mean the same, is very confusing!

For me as a constructivist, the reality that I construct is not a physical reality but a conceptual one. 

For a realist, on the contrary, the reality that he sees as existing independently is actually a combination of the two: physical reality as the “reference” and conceptual reality as its “copy” in his head. 

In constructivism we need to disentangle these two things, and here is where Maturana’s reflections about autopoiesis and cognition become essential. 

Consider for example his differentiation between two fundamental ways in which we, as humans, can understand explanations; he distinguishes two mutually exclusive explanatory paths: the path of ‘objectivity without parentheses’ and the path of ‘objectivity with parentheses’ (Maturana 1988:28ff)

On the explanatory path of objectivity without parentheses, the observer assumes either implicitly or explicitly that he is capable of making statements about the logic of things, as if the logic he accords to them would exist independently of him. He does not ask himself: “How can I say that the logic of this thing exists independently of me?” If someone makes the implicit assumption that he can reference things, as if the logic he accords to them exists independently of him, then he is also effectively stating that the explanations he applies can ultimately be validated by the things themselves, independently of him. This explanatory path therefore contains the implicit and unaware assumption that an individual can reference a logic which exists independently of him and which validates what he says. And what could that be? It is a logic of reality (the logic of being, the essence of things etc.) or in other words a universal truth. It is universal because it exists independently of us. It is valid for everything because it is independent from everything.

 
On the explanatory path of objectivity with parentheses, the observer notes something different, something very interesting: that his explanations are validated by his actions. The logic of his experience is explained by the logic of his other experiences and not by a reference to a logic which is independent of us. The observer sees himself as a source of validation for his own statements. This is the essence of the essence of constructivism!   And it is highly relevant for understanding our responsibility for what we know.

References:

Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F. (1980) Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Maturana, H. R. (1988): REALITY: The Search for Objectivity or the Quest for a Compelling Argument. The Irish Journal of Psychology, Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 25-82.

Maturana, H.R. (1998) Biologie der Realität, Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp

Maturana, H.R. (1992) Explanations and Reality. Transcript of a plenary talk at the Congress "Die Wirklichkeit des Konstruktivismus", Heidelberg, 18.10.1992 http://www.weknow.ch/marco/A1992/Heid/Maturana921018.htm

Verantwortung für Denken und Wissen

"... Man braucht in der Tat gar nicht sehr tief in das konstruktivistische Denken einzudringen, um sich darüber klar zu werden, dass diese Anschauung unweigerlich dazu führt, den denkenden Menschen und ihn allein für sein Denken, Wissen, und somit auch für sein Tun verantwortlich zu machen. Heute ... ist eine Lehre ungemütlich, die andeutet, dass wir die Welt, in der wir zu leben meinen, uns selbst zu verdanken haben." -
Ernst von Glasersfeld, (1981) Einführung in den radikalen Konstruktivismus. In: P. Watzlawick (ed.) Die erfundene Wirklichkeit. Munich, Germany: Piper, 16–38.

David K. Johnson - Sleepysand in the Mind’s Eye

The newest critique to Radical Constructivism (RC), an article by David K. Johnson titled "Footprints in the Sand" in Constructivist Foundations 6 (1),  does in no way contribute to understand the weaknesses of Radical Constructivism, it is merely sleepysand in the mind's eye:

• http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/1 
• http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/1/090.johnson

At the basis of the obfuscation and jungle of misunderstandings contained in David K. Johnson's article lies the fundamental confusion:

• "a THING, in contrast to our thoughts of that THING, surely does exist outside of thought"

This is well exemplified in a statement found in the new book by David K. Johnson & Matthew Silliman (2009:8):

• "But rocks, in contrast to our thoughts of rocks, surely do exist outside of thought, a fact that alone explains Alison’s stumbling on this rock along a road in Vermont without first thinking it into existence." From: Johnson D. K. & Silliman M. R. (2009) Bridges to the world. Sense, Rotterdam, page 8.

From David K. Johnson's article we can learn three lessons:

1. The fundamental emotion of Johnson's critique “is powered by the authority of universally valid knowledge” (Maturana & Poerksen 2004:41-42) and the basis of its explanations is the reference to objects in the external reality.
2. This kind of criticism to RC originates from an unaware confusion between what belongs to RC and what belongs to Realism.
3. A blind spot makes that critics do not understand how to deal with things in themselves and as a consequence easily overlook the intimate relationship between the two sides of the radical constructivist coin: construction & viability.

Man alone is responsible for his thinking - EvG 1984

In 1984 Ernst von Glasersfeld wrote:

• "Indeed, one need not enter very far into constructivist thought to realize that it inevitably leads to the contention that man – and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, therefore, also for what he does."
• "Today, when behaviorists are still intent on pushing all responsibility into the environment, and sociobiologists are trying to place much of it into genes, a doctrine may well seem uncomfortable if it suggests that we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which we appear to be living. (p. 17)
  
• "An introduction to radical constructivism" , in P. Watzlawick (ed.) The invented reality. New York: Norton 1984: 17–40.

End of an experiential world

Ernst von Glasersfeld, an internationally influential cybernetician, originator and developer of Radical Constructivism, died last Friday (Nov. 12th at 7 am EST) at the age of 93 in Amherst (Massachusetts) or, in his own words "entered the eternal skislopes". An obituary will follow on the pages of OIKOS (http://www.oikos.org/psicen.htm) and ASC (http://www.asc-cybernetics.org).

Our acquaintance began in Spring 1985: Ernst called me from Athens (Georgia) on my private phone number in Zürich, Universitätstrasse 17. He had received my "Research Report Nr. 1". From here, during the following 25 years, a beautiful relationship developed, during which he became my best friend and my ideal master.

In a certain sense I also died now with him but at the same time also "entered a new lifeslope".

One year ago, right on the same day, von Glasersfeld had received in the City Hall of Vienna the medal of honour in gold of the city of Vienna and given in the Festsaal the opening talk of the 4th Intern. Heinz von Förster-Congress.

"Constructivism makes life so much nicer and easier because you lose the urge to be right" he said in 2005 at a congress in Vienna; would be nice if we could transfer this to economy, politics, education and everyday life: away from the usual eristic dialectics towards more and more dialogue.

How thinking can alter perception - Nature News 27.10.2010

On Nature online a news article reports about research by Cerf, M. et al. Nature 467, 1104-1108 (2010) which shows how humans can use thinking to alter perception of competing visual images

• Source: http://www.nature.com/news/2010/101027/full/news.2010.568.html

In the news Dr. Moran Cerf gives an interesting interpretation of his EXPERIMENTS:

• "The environment offers some reality," he says, "but your own brain can shape it and override it with its internal deliberations." 
  

The THEORY for this has been developed in the last 40 years within the theory of knowing called Radical Constructivism http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/ 

The All-in-one Puppeteer - A Constructivist Allegory

Zwei Vorteile des Radikalen Konstruktivismus

"Radikaler Konstruktivismus - Versuch einer Wissenstheorie"

(abgetippt aus der CD zum Buch):

• .... Deswegen habe ich oft gesagt, der Konstruktivismus macht das Leben so viel schöner und einfacher weil man den Drang Recht zu haben verliert, das ist nicht  möglich ...<Recht zu haben> ... (Spur 8 / 8:11)

• ... aber auch hier sehe ich einen Vorteil des konstruktivistischen Denken, weil man dann sehr vorsichtig sein muss, dem anderen eine Schuld zuzuschreiben; man weiss ja, man hat das selber konstrukiert irgendwie, wenn es falsch ist, das ist wahrscheinlich mein eigener Fehler. (Spur 8 / 14:10)

2005, edition echoraum, www.echoraum.at