Sunday 13 October 2013

The essence of the essence of constructivism



In one famous article dating from 1988 (German edition 1998), Maturana states that the problem of reality is “the most important problem of our time”. I fully agree with him and I think that realism needs to be expressively refuted and the choice between realism and constructivism cannot be considered “a matter of taste”, an attitude which in my view prevents to make progress in solving the problem of reality in a more viable way. 

In the constructivist thesis that “reality is the construction of an observer” and in the realist thesis that “reality exists independently”, the term reality is merely a homonym, means two different things! Hence the common attitude to mention them, as if they would mean the same, is very confusing!

For me as a constructivist, the reality that I construct is not a physical reality but a conceptual one. 

For a realist, on the contrary, the reality that he sees as existing independently is actually a combination of the two: physical reality as the “reference” and conceptual reality as its “copy” in his head. 

In constructivism we need to disentangle these two things, and here is where Maturana’s reflections about autopoiesis and cognition become essential. 

Consider for example his differentiation between two fundamental ways in which we, as humans, can understand explanations; he distinguishes two mutually exclusive explanatory paths: the path of ‘objectivity without parentheses’ and the path of ‘objectivity with parentheses’ (Maturana 1988:28ff)

On the explanatory path of objectivity without parentheses, the observer assumes either implicitly or explicitly that he is capable of making statements about the logic of things, as if the logic he accords to them would exist independently of him. He does not ask himself: “How can I say that the logic of this thing exists independently of me?” If someone makes the implicit assumption that he can reference things, as if the logic he accords to them exists independently of him, then he is also effectively stating that the explanations he applies can ultimately be validated by the things themselves, independently of him. This explanatory path therefore contains the implicit and unaware assumption that an individual can reference a logic which exists independently of him and which validates what he says. And what could that be? It is a logic of reality (the logic of being, the essence of things etc.) or in other words a universal truth. It is universal because it exists independently of us. It is valid for everything because it is independent from everything.
 
On the explanatory path of objectivity with parentheses, the observer notes something different, something very interesting: that his explanations are validated by his actions. The logic of his experience is explained by the logic of his other experiences and not by a reference to a logic which is independent of us. The observer sees himself as a source of validation for his own statements. This is the essence of the essence of constructivism!   And it is highly relevant for understanding our responsibility for what we know.

References:

Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F. (1980) Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Maturana, H. R. (1988): REALITY: The Search for Objectivity or the Quest for a Compelling Argument. The Irish Journal of Psychology, Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 25-82.
Maturana, H.R. (1998) Biologie der Realität, Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp
Maturana, H.R. (1992) Explanations and Reality. Transcript of a plenary talk at the Congress "Die Wirklichkeit des Konstruktivismus", Heidelberg, 18.10.1992 http://www.weknow.ch/marco/A1992/Heid/Maturana921018.htm

Saturday 8 June 2013

Prinzip der Ethik nach K-O. Apel

„Wenn man zeigen kann, daß schon die logische Argumentation (und damit auch die Wissenschaft) als Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit eine intersubjektiv gültige Ethik voraussetzt, dann ist man in der Lage, die szientischtische Blockierung der ethischen Rationalität in rational zwingender Form aufzuheben und ein für alle Argumentationswilligen unbestreitbares Prinzip der Ethik anzugeben.“

- Karl-Otto Apel: Diskurs und Verantwortung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1988, 36
Dieses Prinzip der Ethik sieht Apel in der wechselseitigen Anerkennung in einer idealen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.
Quelle: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szientismus