Aristotle, Kant and the two worlds

FROM ARISTOTLE (350 BCE)
TO KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1787)
AND ITS 2 WORLDS (2022)

 

We have seen in a previous blog post that according to Aristotle:

• the essence of a definite thing is its form, which is that cause by reason of which the matter is that definite thing (1).

As a cosequence, according to Aristotle's view: GIVEN a definite thing, we can obtain its essence by SEPARATING its form from its matter.

In that post I claimed that Aristotle made a small error and proposed how to correct it. In the previous sentence, the error can be corrected by simply substituting the third "is" with "becomes". Then we obtain:

• the essence of a definite thing is its form, which is that cause by reason of which the matter BECOMES that definite thing.

The correction is small but the consequences are huge: the definite thing is no longer GIVEN. It is a product that results from ADDING form to matter.

Thus, this simple substitution leads to a REVOLUTION: it turns the whole situation upside down, like in Kant's Copernican Revolution.

But there is a second main consequence, that Kant forgot to mention: that with this substitution, instead of living in one single World (a universe of definite things), we now now live in TWO WORLDS:

1. the world of GIVEN indefinite matter = one physical world, equal for all
2. the world of PRODUCED definite things = many experiential worlds, one for each individual human being.
   

To be human is to keep these two worlds in a homeostatic balance.

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Footnote:
(1) "... one looks for that cause of the matter (but that is the form), by reason of which the matter is a what (some definite thing); but that is the essence (of the thing)." - Aristotle (350 BCE), Metaphysics, book VII (Z), 17, 1041b.